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| Enriques, Luca. |
| This paper argues that in revising the Takeover Bid Directive, EU policymakers should adopt a neutral approach toward takeovers, i.e. enact rules that neither hamper nor promote them. The rationale behind this approach is that takeovers can be both value-creating and value-decreasing and there is no way to tell ex ante whether they are of the former or the latter kind. Unfortunately, takeover rules cannot be crafted so as to hinder all the bad takeovers while at the same time promoting the good ones. Further, contestability of control is not cost-free, because it has a negative impact on managers’ and block-holders’ incentives to make firm-specific investments of human capital, which in turn affects firm value. It is thus argued that individual companies... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Takeover Bid Directive; Board Neutrality; Mandatory Bid Rule; Market for Corporate Control; Financial Economics; K22; G34; G38. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/60748 |
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| Clementi, Gian Luca; Cooley, Thomas. |
| In this paper we describe the important features of executive compensation in the US from 1993 to 2006. Some confirm what has been found for earlier periods and some are novel. Notable facts are that: the compensation distribution is highly skewed; each year, a sizeable fraction of chief executives lose money; the use of security grants has increased over time; the income accruing to CEOs from the sale of stock increased; regardless of the measure we adopt, compensation responds strongly to innovations in shareholder wealth; measured as dollar changes in compensation, incentives have strengthened over time, measured as percentage changes in wealth, they have not changed in any appreciable way. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: CEO; Pay–Performance Sensitivity; Stock; Options; Financial Economics; G34; J33; M52. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/92834 |
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| Giannetti, Mariassunta; Simonov, Andrei. |
| Exploiting the Japanese banking crisis as a laboratory, we provide firm-level evidence on the real effects of bank bailouts. Government recapitalizations result in positive abnormal returns for the clients of recapitalized banks. After recapitalizations, banks extend larger loans to their clients and some firms increase investment, but do not create more jobs than comparable firms. Most importantly, recapitalizations allow banks to extend larger loans to low and high quality firms alike, and low quality firms experience higher abnormal returns than other firms. Interestingly, recapitalizations by private investors have similar effects. Moreover, bank mergers engineered to enhance bank stability appear to hurt the borrowers of the sounder banks involved in... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Recapitalization; Merger; Banking Crisis; Financial Economics; G21; G34. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55330 |
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| Karolyi, G. Andrew; Liao, Rose C.. |
| We examine the motives for and consequences of 5,317 failed and completed cross-border acquisitions constituting $619 billion of total activity that were led by government-controlled acquirers over the period from 1990 to 2008. We benchmark this activity at the aggregate country level and also at the deal level with cross-border acquisitions involving corporate acquirers over the same period. We find that government-led deal activity is relatively more intense for geographically-closer countries, but also relatively less sensitive to differences in the level of economic development of the acquirer’s and target’s home countries, in the quality of their legal institutions and accounting standards, and to how stringent are restrictions on FDI flows in their... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Government-controlled Acquirers; Cross-Border Acquisitions; Financial Economics; G15; G34. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/60686 |
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